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Since early 2007, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has experienced several highly pathogenic
avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 outbreaks in the falconry and poultry sectors. The public health
threat associated with peculiar husbandry systems, requiring close contact between humans and
birds of prey, highlights the need of an improved understanding of the epidemiology and of the
viral characteristics of H5N1 viruses circulating in the region. Here we report molecular and
phylogenetic analyses of H5N1 viruses isolated in the KSA in 2007 in distinct compartments of
avian husbandry. From the results of our investigation it appears that two separate introductions
into the different sectors occurred. The identification of specific amino acid mutations, which are
described as genetic signatures of human influenza A viruses or known to confer resistance to
antiviral drugs, raises concerns for the possible human health implications of the KSA H5N1
viruses.
Since late 2005, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
viruses of H5N1 subtype have spread into Europe, the
Middle East and Africa affecting both wild birds and
poultry (Alexander, 2007; Salzberg et al., 2007). Three
distinct sublineages were identified in these regions, termed
EMA1, EMA2 and EMA3 by Salzberg et al. (2007), but
designated 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 in this manuscript,
respectively. Incursions into the European Union have
been seen mainly in wild birds, and the limited outbreaks
occurring in poultry, as a result of the spread from wild
birds or from poultry to other domestic birds, have been
promptly eradicated in the vast majority of the European
countries (Pittman & Laddomada, 2008). In contrast, in
Africa and in the Middle East, since the first outbreaks
reported in early 2006, there has been extensive spread and
circulation of H5N1 virus in poultry, but only an extremely
limited number of isolations from wild birds (Fasina et al.,
2007; Gaidet et al., 2007). To date it is still unclear how
H5N1 virus reached these two regions, whether through
wild bird movements, trade of infected poultry commod-
ities or both.
Between February and April 2006, infections due to H5N1
HPAI virus were reported in five Middle Eastern countries,
namely: Iraq and Kuwait (February 2006); Jordan and
Israel (March 2006) and Palestine (April 2006). In the same
period, one suspected H5N1 case was reported in falcons in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) (ProMED-mail,
2006). However, the first confirmed case of HPAI H5N1
The GenBank/EMBL/DDBJ accession numbers for the sequences
reported in this paper are EU445682, EU590684–EU590695,
EU424135, EU424136 and EU596411.
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KSA experienced a number of outbreaks (n529, as of 15
April 2008) (OIE, 2008) of HPAI H5N1 in three distinct
compartments: falconry, backyard poultry and, at a later
stage, industrially reared poultry. Initially, the reported
outbreaks were limited to the backyard poultry and
falconry sectors. But, on 14 November 2007, the first
outbreak in the commercial sector was reported in a broiler
breeder flock in the Al Kharj region of KSA.
The first case of H5N1 infection in KSA was reported from
specimens collected from imported Houbara bustards
(Chlamidotis undulata macqueenii) (H. Aidaros, A.
Tripodi and N. Honhold, FAO/OIE Crisis Management
Centre, Rome, personal communication). These birds are a
traditional, highly prized quarry of falconers and they are
traded extensively from Central Asia to the Middle East
(Bailey et al., 2000). The art of falconry is an important
cultural activity in the Arabian Peninsula which has been
practised for more than a millennium. Falcons are often
raised in households and handled on a daily basis by
owners and caretakers. The falconry activities involve both
keeping birds of prey for hunting and rearing other birds,
such as Houbara bustards, which are used as prey. It has
been estimated that the illegal trade of falcons from Central
Asia to the Middle East may involve as many as 14000 or
more birds annually (ProMED-mail, 2006). Thus, trading
of live birds (both predators and prey) associated with
falconry represents a potential vehicle for introduction and
spread of avian influenza viruses in the KSA and in other
countries of the Gulf area. In addition, falcon husbandry
methods may result in an increased risk of human
exposure to H5N1, compared with other avian rearing
practices. An improved understanding of the epidemiology
and of the viral characteristics of H5N1 viruses circulating
in the region would appear essential in managing the
animal and human health risks.
In this paper we report the first molecular and phylogenetic
analyses of H5N1 viruses isolated from the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (KSA) from distinct compartments of avian
husbandry.
Following standard virus isolation procedures (OIE, 2005)
at the Central Veterinary Laboratory in Riyadh (KSA), 20
viruses were isolated from 20 different outbreaks and sent
to the OIE/FAO Reference laboratory in Italy (IZSVe) for
confirmatory diagnosis and molecular analysis (Table 1) as
part of the FAO assistance mission in the country. Samples
were processed for subtyping and pathotyping as described
previously (Alexander & Spackman, 1981; European
Commission, 2006). Subsequently, based on the results
obtained from analysis of the 20 haemagglutinin (HA) gene
sequences, the whole genome of each of eight represent-
ative isolates was sequenced (Table 1).
The amplification of the eight viral gene segments was done
by RT-PCR using gene-specific primers (available upon
request). PCR products were purified (ExoSAP-IT) and
sequenced in a 3130xl Genetic Analyzer (Applied
Biosystems). Phylogenetic analysis was performed using the
neighbour-joining method in the MEGA3p r o g r a m m e
(Kumar et al., 2004). The tree topology was confirmed by
thegenerationofamaximum-likelihood(ML)treeestimated
using DNAML in the PHYLIP v3.6 package (tree not shown)
(Felsenstein, 1989). The GenBank/EMBL/DDBJ accession
numbers of the eight gene segments of the isolates A/
Table 1. List of H5N1 influenza viruses analysed in the present study
Virus Location Genes analysed Sublineage
A/houbara bustard/Saudi Arabia/6732-1/2007 Summan Entire genome
2.2.3
A/falcon/Saudi Arabia/6732-2/2007 Summan Entire genome
A/ostrich/Saudi Arabia/6732-3/2007 Dammam Entire genome
2.2.2
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-4/2007 Hail Entire genome
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-5/2007 Riyadh HA
A/turkey/Saudi Arabia/6732-6/2007 Riyadh Entire genome
A/duck/Saudi Arabia/6732-7/2007 Riyadh Entire genome
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-8/2007 Al Mustaqbal-Kharj HA
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-9/2007 Muzhahmia HA
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-10/2007 Al Marwa project HA
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-11/2007 Salman-Kharj HA
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-12/2007 Sadco-Kharj HA
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-13/2007 Muzhahmia Entire genome
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-14/2007 Durmah HA
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-15/2007 Riyadh HA
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-16/2007 Qassim poultry, Kharj HA
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-17/2007 Al Khelwaey HA
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-18/2007 Thadiq Entire genome
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-19/2007 Aid Jediae HA
A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-20/2007 Al Akhwain-Kharj HA
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Saudi Arabia/6732-6/2007 are EU445682, EU590684–
EU590695, EU424135, EU424136 and EU596411.
Phylogenetic analysis of the HA gene revealed that all the
20 KSA isolates belonged to genetic clade 2.2 (WHO/OIE/
FAO H5N1 Evolution working group, 2008) and that
they were closely related to the viruses circulating in birds
throughout Europe, Russia, Africa and the Middle East
since late 2005.
Interestingly, the phylogenetic trees produced for each of
the eight genes showed that the sequences of the KSA
viruses grouped into two distinct sublineages.
The nucleotide (nt) sequences of the entire genome of the
viruses isolated from domestic birds (A/ostrich/Saudi
Arabia/6732-3/2007, A/turkey/Saudi Arabia/6732-6/2007,
A/duck/Saudi Arabia/6732-7/2007, A/chicken/Saudi
Arabia/6732-13/2007, A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-4/
2007, A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/6732-18/2007) were closely
related to each other for all eight gene segments and were
placed in sublineage 2.2.2 (Fig. 1). The highest similarity
was seen with H5N1 viruses of the same sublineage isolated
in Nigeria during 2006 (the nt identity for the HA gene
ranged between 98.9 and 99.6% with the A/ck/Nigeria/
FA6/2006 strain). In contrast, the two viruses isolated from
the Houbara bustard and falcon that were studied (A/
Houbara bustard/Saudi Arabia/6732-1/2007 and A/falcon/
Saudi Arabia/6732-2/2007) clearly clustered in sublineage
2.2.3. Interestingly, these two viruses had highest nt
similarity in the HA gene with H5N1 viruses isolated in
Kuwait from domestic birds and a falcon (99.8% similarity
with strain A/falcon/Kuwait/1019-7/2007) (Fig. 1).
At the amino acid level, the HA0 cleavage site sequence of
all 20 isolates was PQGERRRKKR*GLF, which is identical
to those of recent African, Asian and European H5N1
HPAI strains.
Amino acid sequence analysis of the surface proteins
revealed that KSA isolates did not possess mutations linked
to an increased affinity toward human-like sialic acid
substrates in the binding domain of the HA protein
(Matrosovich et al., 1997). No molecular changes asso-
ciated with a modified susceptibility to neuraminidase
inhibitors were observed in the neuraminidase protein of
the strains analysed. Notably, sequence analysis of the M2
ion channel protein showed that the KSA viruses belonging
to 2.2.2 sublineage had the amino acid substitution S31N.
It has been reported that this mutation confers resistance
to adamantanes, a group of antiviral drugs used for
treatment and prevention of human influenza A virus
infections (Ilyushina et al., 2005; Suzuki et al., 2003). This
substitution has been detected in amantadine-resistant
H5N1 influenza viruses isolated from humans and poultry
in Asia between 1996 and 2005 (Cheung et al., 2006;
Ilyushina et al., 2005).
The E627K mutation in the PB2 gene, which has been
associated withanincrease of virulenceof influenza A viruses
for mammals (Subbarao et al., 1993), was also detected in all
the KSA viruses analysed in the present study.
The amino acid sequence analyses of internal genes
revealed the existence of three other host-specific muta-
tions. In the NS1 gene of all the KSA strains belonging to
the 2.2.2 sublineage, we observed the E227K mutation
(Table 2). This mutation is located in the extreme C-
terminal of the NS1, which has been demonstrated to
modulate pathogenicity of avian influenza (AI) through
mechanisms not completely clarified yet (Jackson et al.,
2008; Obenauer et al., 2006). In particular the four C-
terminal residues of the gene correspond to a PDZ ligand
domain, which is a protein–protein recognition module
that organizes diverse cell-signalling assemblies (Sheng &
Sala, 2001). Avian influenza viruses naturally possess
glutamic acid (E) at position 227, while human influenza
viruses contain arginine (R) (Chen et al., 2006). Finkelstein
et al. (2007) observed that H1N1 subtype viruses cir-
culating during the 1918 ‘Spanish’ human pandemic,
which are thought to have an avian progenitor virus,
possessed the amino acid lysine (K) in this position, and
were therefore similar to the KSA strains analysed in the
present study. A recent reverse genetics study indicated that
recombinant viruses containing C-terminal NS1 sequences
from the 1918 H1N1 and some recent H5N1 HPAI viruses
show increased virulence in mice (Jackson et al., 2008). The
results of the BLAST search showed that the KSA viruses are
the first reported H5N1 strains of the Qinghai (2.2) lineage
possessing this mutation and apart from these, it seems
that the E227K mutation has only been recorded in two
H5N1 Indonesian strains isolated in 2005 (GenBank
accession numbers CY014189 and CY014196). Thus, the
E227K mutation appears to be a rare amino acid signature
which in this case was presumably acquired by H5N1
viruses in KSA in 2007.
Host markers conserved in the human influenza virus
population (Chen et al., 2006) were detected in the PB1
gene (R327K) of the 2.2.2 lineage KSA strains and in the
NP gene (V33I) of A/Houbara bustard/Saudi Arabia/6732-
1/2007, A/falcon/Saudi Arabia/6732-2/2007, A/ostrich/
Saudi Arabia/6732-3/2007 and A/chicken/Saudi Arabia/
6732-4/2007 strains (Table 2).
From the results of the present investigation it appears that
two distinct sublineages (2.2.2 and 2.2.3) are co-circulating
in KSA in different compartments of avian husbandry. It
can be inferred from this that there were two separate
introductions of H5N1 into KSA, and that despite the
circulation of H5N1 for almost a year, there appears to
have been no spill-over from the captive bird to the
domestic bird population or vice versa, suggesting that the
two compartments are epidemiologically separated. This is
apparently in contrast to the situation in neighbouring
Kuwait, where 2.2.3 viruses apparently circulate in both
populations (Fig. 1).
The strains isolated from poultry in KSA were closely
related to poultry viruses isolated in Nigeria. Surprisingly,
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http://vir.sgmjournals.org 2693Fig. 1. Phylogenetic tree for the HA gene constructed by the neighbour-joining method, which includes eight representative
KSA viruses. The evolutionary distances were computed using the maximum composite likelihood method and are in the units of
the number of base substitutions per site. Sequences obtained in this study were labelled with a filled circle. The numbers at
each branch point represent bootstrap values and were determined by bootstrap analysis using 1000 replications. Bar, 0.005
nucleotide substitutions/site; *, sequence available in the EpiFlu database at the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza
Data (GISAID; http://platform.gisaid.org/).
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with early Nigerian strains obtained in 2006, rather than
with viruses that appeared to be predominant in 2007
(Monne et al., 2008). This suggests an early epidemiolo-
gical connection between KSA and Nigeria resulting in
spread from one country to another or that the viruses
spreading to these two countries came from a common
source. Spread of descendants of early Nigerian viruses
seems to have occurred efficiently in diverse avian species
reared commercially (chickens, turkeys, ostriches and
ducks) and farms located in different parts of the
Kingdom, suggesting poor biosecurity across the commer-
cial sector.
Our findings in KSA do not represent the first report of
multiple introductions of HPAI H5N1 avian influenza
viruses into a given country. The three distinct H5N1
sublineages were identified in wild birds in Germany
between 2006 and 2007 (Starick et al., 2008). During 2006,
two distinct sublineages of the HPAI H5N1 were also
introduced into Italy (Salzberg et al., 2007) and France (Le
Gall-Recule ´ et al., 2008) through wild birds.
To the best of our knowledge, the introduction of multiple
H5N1 genogroups in European countries has not resulted
in the generation of reassortant strains. This is probably
due to the fact that infections in Europe have been mainly
confined to wild bird populations and extensive virus
circulation in poultry has been avoided.
In contrast, it was shown recently that the co-circulation of
two sublineages (2.2.1 and 2.2.2) in Nigerian poultry
resulted in the generation of a novel 2.2.1/ 2.2.2 reassortant
strain that became predominant in 2007 (Monne et al.,
2008). Based on the results of the present study, it is
possible that a novel scenario exists in the KSA. In this
country, multiple introductions of HPAI H5N1 viruses
have led to the co-circulation of at least two different virus
sublineages, which appear so far to have been maintained
separated in distinct avian compartments. However, this
separation might not be maintained in the future,
especially if spread of the virus is not efficiently controlled
in the country. Control policies may be aided by
vaccination of susceptible birds, including falcons (Lierz
et al., 2007).
In addition to the virulence markers that are present in
most Qinghai-lineage (2.2) viruses, such as the PB2 E627K
mutation, the KSA isolates of 2.2.2 sublineage from
domestic birds exhibited a specific mutation, S31N, in
the M2 protein, which is associated with resistance to
adamantane antivirals such as amantadine. Other muta-
tions, known as genetic markers of human influenza A
viruses, namely NS E227K, PB1 R327K and NP V33I, have
also been detected (Table 2). These findings raise concerns
for the possible human health implications of these
genotypes, in view of the local husbandry methods.
It should be noted that in the Middle East, in addition to
the circulation of the H5N1 viruses described here, there is
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http://vir.sgmjournals.org 2695evidence of extensive circulation of H9N2 viruses (Aamir et
al., 2007, Monne et al., 2007). The co-circulation of H9N2
and H5N1 subtypes of AI increases concerns about the
generation of reassortant viruses with potential animal and
human health implications.
The findings of this study indicate that improved
surveillance programmes are essential to monitor the
situation in the KSA.
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